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i e n c e s ,
ta in ty  :
Suunary
THE CAPITAL MARKET AND THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRM
IN THE THEORY OF FINANCE
The generally accepted objective of the firm j-n the theory of
corporate finance is the naximization of the value of the firn in
the capital market. Based on a survey of the role of capital market
value in the most connon textbooks in the field, the subject matter
of this dissertation is an inquiry into the origins of the objective
of value maximization. It appears that this objective is based on a
welfare theoretic analysis of f irms and consuners in a perfect and
cornplete capital market. In such an idealized narket, all consumers
participating in a firn are unanirnous in their approval of the
investment-financing plan of the firn that naximizes its narket
value. This unaninity all-ows for a separation of the decision makino
of the firn from the consunption decisions of its shareholders.
The research in this dissertation is focused on the so-called
unaninity theory, that has been developed in the l iterature. Related
to this theory, a crit ical analysÍ-s is being nade of the idealizing
characteristics of perfection and completeness, that are attributed
to the capi-tal narket in the finance literature. A najor objective
of this dissertation is to relate the welfare economics oriented
literature of f inancial equil ibrium to the common literature on
corporate financial management.
The second chapter presents the nechanism of the basic Fisher
separation theoren in the weLl-known one period certainty nodel of a
partial consumption-investment equil ibriun. A prelininary survey is
made of the conditions for a perfect capital market, that are
generally accepted in the l iterature. Some inpJ-ications of narket
inperfection are identif ied.
In the third chapter the analysis of value maxinization and
separation is specified according to the Arrow-Debreu states of the
worl-d model of a capital market equil ibriun. In a one period
framework the basic concepts of elementary state clains and
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(subject ive)  impl ic l - t  pr ice systems of  a secur i t ies market  are
identif ied, and capital market completeness is defined. The chapter
explores the investement and financing equil ibrj-un of the firm, and
the separat ion of  i ts  decis ions f rom consumers '  decis ions in  a
Pareto opt imal  a l locat ion on a conplete (and per fect . )  capi ta l
market .  An intu i t ive descr ipt ion is  presented of  the possi -b i l i t ies
of a break-down of the separation theoren when the capital market is
incomplete.
Chapter four provides a rigorous analysis of the properties of a
perfect and a conplete market, and the interrelations between these
two concepts. 0f particular concern is the role of narket
inperfections in preventing the market from being complete. With
respect to incomplete markets, the condition of constant 'spanningr
and j-ts relevance for the independence of (implicit) capital market
pr ices is  considered.
In the fifth chapter, an extensive review is presented of the
major l ines of analysis in the l iterature on value naxirnization j-n
inconplete capital narkets. The theoretical research on shareholder
unanimity in a general states of the world approach of uncertainty
is summarized, indicating the importance of the conditions of a
f r ic t ion less market ,  constant  'spaaning ' ,  and pr ice independence.
The latter has to be defined as "perceivedt' price independence,
since the competit ive conditions for actual príce independence wil l
ín general preclude the undertaking of additional investrnent
pro jects by f i - rms.  As a specia l  case,  f i rn  value naximizat ion is
considered in the framework of the two parameter capital asset
pr ic ing model  (CAPM).  As a resul t  o f  the market  equi l ibr ium property
of portfolio separation, constant tspanning' is no longer a relevant
condition for unaniroity and Pareto optimality. Recent research on
unalimity in models of a "large econonyrt indicates that the
'spanning' condition may also be irrelevant in the more general case
( i .e .  outs ide the CAPM),  in  which,  noreover,  a lso actual  pr ice
independence becomes of interest. However, it is concluded that this








































The general, conditions for shareholder unaninity are summarized
as:  (1)  f r ic t ion less capi ta l  narkets,  e.B.  wi th respect  to  the
dist r ibut ion of  in format ion;  (2)  constant  'spanning '  or  a market
equi l ibr ium wi th universal  por t fo l io  separat ion;  (J)  "perceived"
price independence.
In chapter six these assumptions of unanimity theory, and
accordingly the relevance of the unani-nity analysis, are evaluated
fron a nethodological poi-nt of view. The scientif ic nethodology of
instrumentalisn and its impact on financial economics is considered.
Also the transfer from an (equil ibrium) analysis on the aggregate
level of the capital market to financial decision making of the
indj -v idual  f i rm ( i .e .  organizat ion)  is  cr i t ica l ly  assessed.
The evaluation indicates that, when accepting value maxinizati-on as
the unique objective of f irms, the theory of corporate finance
adopts a concept of decision naking of f irms that has only l imited
correspondence with the problems of corporate financial nanagement.
It is suggested that the objective of value maxinization, as it is
assigned to the firm in the present theory of corporate finance,
essential-l-y is a normatíue goal. This nay lead to reconsider the
existing gap between corporate financial theory and the practice of
corporate financial nanagenent.
